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I review the state of the art of the academic theoretical and empirical literature on the 
potential trade-off between competition and stability in banking. There are two basic channels 
through which competition may increase instability: by exacerbating the coordination 
problem of depositors/investors on the liability side and fostering runs/panics, and by 
increasing incentives to take risk and raise failure probabilities. The competition-stability 
trade-off is characterized and the implications of the analysis for regulation and competition 
policy are derived. It is found that optimal regulation may depend on the intensity of 
competition. 
JEL-Code: G21, G28, L40. 
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Banking went from being one of the most regulated sectors in the economy after the 
crisis in the 1930s to a much more lightly regulated sector with the liberalization process 
started in the 1970s in the US. The first period was market by few crises while there has 
been much more instability in the second one, culminating with the 2007- subprime 
crisis. In the first period competition was thought to be detrimental to stability and in 
many countries competition policy was not applied fully to the sector until recently 
despite the importance of the banking sector in the economy and the costs and 
inefficiencies induced by financial repression. Indeed, until relatively recently central 
banks and regulators were complacent with collusion agreements among banks and 
preferred to deal with a concentrated sector with soft rivalry.  
 
This changed with deregulation and the idea that competition enhances efficiency, be it 
productive, allocative, or dynamic (innovation). Competition policy is now taken 
seriously in the banking sector.
1 However, the crisis started in 2007 with subprime 
mortgages, becoming systemic after the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
with cumulative banking losses estimated as 1,1 trillion € (up to November 2009) and 
massive bailouts (state aid with commitments in public interventions in the EU and US) 
of up to 30% of GDP, has overridden competition policy concerns. Indeed, the public 
help programs have distorted competition and created an uneven playing field in terms of 
the cost of capital and perception of safety and soundness. Market power concerns on 
mergers have been also overruled. In the UK Lloyds TBS took over the troubled HBOS 
(merger of Halifax and Bank of Scotland) in a merger opposed by the Office of Fair 
Trade creating a large entity, while the same Lloyds TBS had not been allowed to take 
over Abbey in 2001. The investment banking business has been consolidated in the US 
with the forced takeovers of Bear Sterns by JP Morgan and of Merrill Lynch by Bank of 
America. The result is potentially weak competition among the players left. Those 
consolidations add to the recent trend of increased consolidation within countries, across 
countries and across business lines (e.g. forming financial conglomerates).
2 
 
Banking and financial markets display the whole array of classical market failures, due to 
externalities (fragility with coordination problems and contagion), asymmetric 
information (excessive risk taking with agency problems, moral hazard and adverse 
selection), and potential market power. This has led to regulation to protect the system, 
the small investor, and market competitiveness. The problem is that facilities like the 
lender of last resort, deposit insurance and “too big to fail” policies introduce further 
distortions and exacerbate the excessive risk taking problem. In fact, the crisis has 
uncovered massive regulatory failure as well and potential contradiction between 
regulatory intervention and competition policy. 
 
                                                 
1   In the US banking becomes subject to competition law in the 1960s with the end of its antitrust 
exemption. In the EU the European Commission has intervened since the 1980s against a range of 
restrictive practices, in mergers and in state aid. See Carletti and Vives (2009). 
2   See, e.g. Group of Ten (2001).  
  2This paper takes stock of what we know on the relationship between competition and 
stability, and suggests how to deal with the interplay of regulation and competition issues 
in banking in the aftermath of the systemic crisis started in 2007. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 examines the trends in the banking sector 
and in its regulation, taking into account the impact of the crisis. Section 3 explains the 
uniqueness of banks, why the banking system is fragile and the role of regulation.
3 
Section 4 examines the trade-off between competition and stability in banking from a 
theoretical perspective both from the point of view of fragility and of potential excessive 
risk taking. Section 5 surveys the empirical evidence available. Section 6 ponders 
whether we can regulate away the competition-stability trade-off. Section 7 examines the 
policy response to the crisis and summary and concluding remarks close the paper.  
 
 
2. Trends in the banking sector 
Two periods can be distinguished in the recent history of the financial sector: Tight 
regulation, intervention, and stability, from the 1940s up to the 1970s, followed by a 
period marked by liberalization and greater instability. (See Figure 1.) 
 
From the 1940s to the 1970s, competition between financial institutions was severely 
limited by the regulation of rates, activities, and investments, the separation between 
commercial banking, insurance, and investment banking (Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in 
the US)
4, restrictions on the activity of the savings banks, and geographical segregation 
(in the US). Universal banking remained in some European countries. Deposit insurance 
was established, and the central bank acted as lender of last resort to the financial system.  
 
The stability of this earlier period contrasts with the sizeable increase in the number of 
failures and crises in the later period, in which the sector was liberalized and competition 
introduced.
5 International evidence points at liberalization as one of the factors, together 
with inadequate macro policies, adverse macro shocks, and vulnerability of the foreign 
sector, to explain banking crises. That is, liberalization, even controlling for a wide range 
of factors, increases banking fragility. There are also strong indications that the 
institutional environment (e.g., in terms of the rule of law and contract enforcement) and 
inappropriate regulation that accompanies liberalization reinforce the development of 
crises.
6 This is consistent with banking crises in diverse places like the US (S&Ls), 
Japan, Scandinavia and Spain. In all those cases regulatory failure seems to have played 
an important role in the crisis.
7 Despite the crises episodes financial liberalization has 
helped in general financial development, and therefore output growth. 
                                                 
3   Sections 2 and 3 are partially based on Vives (2001, 2006). 
4   The Glass-Steagall Act prohibited any one institution from acting as any combination of an investment 
bank, a commercial bank, and/or an insurance company. 
5   See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, b). 
6   See, for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2001)). 
7   See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) for the US case and Hoshi and Kayshap (2000) for Japan. In both 
cases increased competitive pressures on financial institutions (e.g. competition from nonbank 
  3 
Figure 1. Proportion of countries with banking crises: 1900-2008, weighted by their share of 
world income. Source: Figure 1 in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a). 
 
Liberalization consisted on the lifting of controls on rates and on banking investment 
activities, and of geographical restrictions (with the Riegle-Neal Act in the US in 1994), 
the elimination of compulsory investment coefficients, and the convergence between the 
activities of institutions of various types (e.g. between savings banks and ordinary banks, 
between commercial banking and investment banking –definite repeal of Glass-Steagall 
Act with the Financial Services Modernization Act in 1999, between banking and 
insurance –up to a point).
8 Behind the process of liberalization and deregulation we find 
advances in information technology, in the processing of transactions (automatic teller 
machines, telephone and electronic banking), and in computational capacity, as well as in 
management techniques and risk coverage (e.g. the use of derivative instruments and 
securitization techniques). An integral part of the process was the liberalization of 
international capital movements and the general reduction in transport costs and barriers 
to trade; financial globalization, in short. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
intermediaries allowed by deregulation) leads to overexpansion in risky lines of business (e.g. real 
state) which are not checked because of lax supervision and regulatory forbearance together with 
implicit protection of entities in trouble, In Scandinavia the roots of the early 1990s crisis are to be 
found in a conjunction of factors after the financial liberalization of the 1980's: lax enforcement of 
capital requirements, poor supervision, lack of internal risk control methods, together with mistakes in 
fiscal and monetary policy in the context of an asset price bubble (See, e.g., Honkapohja (2009).) In 
Spain financial liberalization started in the 1970s and the banking crisis of the first half of the 1980s is 
explained by the large impact of the economic crisis derived from the oil shocks, the close links of 
banks with industrial firm, lack of diversification of banks' industrial portfolios, bad management and 
inadequate supervision (see Caminal, Gual and Vives (1990)). 
8  For example, Citicorp (a commercial bank holding company) merged with Travelers Group (an 
insurance company) in 1998 to form the conglomerate Citigroup. 
  4The result of the liberalization process has been an increase in competition, both within 
and from outside the banking industry, with banks facing direct competition from 
financial markets and the development of disintermediation and financial innovation. 
Market integration (in Europe and elsewhere) has contributed decisively to the increase in 
competition in wholesale and investment banking. Interestingly, the share of assets held 
by banks relative to non-bank financial intermediaries is declining in developed 
economies (in the US up to 2007) although banks assets are not declining relative to total 
financial assets because the share of non-bank intermediaries grows at the expense of 
directly held assets.




















Figure 2: Distribution of US financial assets by the main types of financial intermediaries. 
Source: Barth et al. (1997), and updated data from Flow of Fund Accounts, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
The liberalization process has resulted also in a tremendous expansion of financial 
intermediation with financial assets of intermediaries increasing sharply as a percentage 
of GDP (in the US the percentage goes from less than 100% in 1950 to a peak of more 
than 300% in 2007, with assets in banks going from 50% to 100% in the same period, see 
Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Relative size of the US financial sector and the banking industry (Financial 
assets/GDP). Source: “Flow of Funds Accounts”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
 
This effective expansion of the financial market has implied that even banking, in spite of 





Figure 4. Growth Rates in U.S. Real Financial Assets (Three year moving average: 1950-2008). 
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
 
  6Before the 2007 crisis banking was evolving from the traditional business of taking 
deposits and granting (and monitoring) loans to the provision of services to investors 
(investment funds/asset management, advice and insurance) and firms (consulting, 
insurance, mergers and acquisitions, underwriting of equity and debt issues, 
securitization, risk management), and proprietary trading. In a financial conglomerate we 
can distinguish a retail bank, an investment or corporate bank, asset management, 
proprietary trading, and insurance. The infamous model of “originate and distribute” 
banking, where banks try to get rid of credit risk by originating mortgage loans and 
quickly securitizing them leaving the monitoring of mortgages in a limbo, is a good 
example of the evolving banking process. At the same time even if banks created off-
balance sheet vehicles (SIV, ABCP conduits) in the end they were insuring them with 
liquidity lines. In any case the financial margin made way for fee and commission 
revenue and there was a switch from investment in bricks and mortar (the branches) to 
investment in communication networks, information technology, and highly specialized 
human capital. Post crisis the financial margin has gained again importance (if nothing 
else because of the very low or zero interest rate policy of central banks) and the share of 
banks’ assets in financial assets is up from pre-crisis levels (see Figure 2). The return to 
traditional banking is seen also in Figure 4 where recently commercial banking grows 
more than total financial intermediaries in real assets. 
 
Restructuring is taking the form of consolidation, with similar declines in the US and 
Europe on the number of banks in 1997-2007 (22% decline in the US and a 29% decline 
in EU-15). In Europe there has been a predominance of domestic and, more recently, 
cross-border, mergers
10 and in the US of interstate mergers. A consequence is that despite 
an increase in national concentration at the US level in the last twenty years (see Figure 5 
for assets) local concentration (measured in MSA and non-MSA counties for deposits)
11 
shows, if anything, a decreasing tendency (Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999), Table 7 
in White (2009)). 
                                                 
10  For example, Hypobank-Vereinsbank in Germany, UBS-SBC in Switzerland, BNP-Paribas in France, 
IMI-San Paolo and Crédito Italiano-Unicrédito in Italy, Santander-BCH to form BSCH and BBV-
Argentaria to form BBVA in Spain. Exceptions are some cross-border deals in the Benelux and 
Scandinavia. Some cross-border mergers have failed because of political interference of national 
authorities. See Danthine et al. (1999). 
11   Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are used as proxies for urban local markets while non-MSAs 
are used as proxies for rural local markets). 
  7 
 
Figure 5. US CR5 ratio. Share of the five largest depositary institutions in % of total assets
12 
Source: FDIC and Federal Reserve. 
 
In Europe the dominance of domestic mergers tends to increase local concentration (e.g., 
in 19 over 27 EU markets the CR5 in assets is above 50% in 2007). 
13 (See Figures 6, 7 
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Figure 6. Share of CR5 in % of total assets. Source: ECB (2006, 2007, 2008). 
 
                                                 
12   The merger of Wells Fargo and Wachovia is accounted for in 2008. 


























Figure 7: Herfindahl index (total assets). Source: ECB (2004, 2008) 
 
In the US the CR-5 ratio for assets has increased in 2008 to 36% (with several pots crisis 
operations including JP Morgan-Washington Mutual and Wells Fargo-Wachovia) from a 
level of 23% in 2001.
14 This contrasts with the movement in EU-15 from 52% to 54.5% 
(unweighted average) and from 37.6% to 44% (weighted average) in the same period.
15 
 
In summary, liberalization has been associated with an increase in competition faced by 
financial intermediaries, but bank assets have not declined in relation to total financial 
assets, and with an increase in the incidence of crises. At the same time, banking has 
transformed itself towards services provision and restructuring has tended to increase 
aggregate concentration (although the consequences of this may have been different in 
relevant retail local markets in the US and Europe). The crisis marks a return to 
traditional banking and tends to exacerbate the consolidation trend. 
 
The introduction of competition in banking has been accompanied by checking risk 
taking with capital requirements, allowing banks to rely on their own internal models to 
assess and control risk, and including disclosure requirements for financial institutions in 
order to increase transparency and foster market discipline. A flexible view of capital 
requirements
16, supervision, and market discipline are the pillars of the Basel II 
framework. The rationale of the reformed framework was to provide more risk sensitivity 
                                                 
14   From 2000 to 2008 the CR-10 ratio for deposits goes from 36% to almost 51.5%. 
15   See Schildbach (2009) for the US. 
16   Allowing banks to choose from a menu of approaches (for example, standardized and internal rating) 
to measure risk (credit, market and operational). 
  9to capital requirements. Supervisors would assess how well banks are matching their 
capital to the risks assumed and banks would disclose information on its capital structure, 
accounting practices, risk exposures and capital adequacy. In summary, capital 
requirements plus appropriate supervision and market discipline were seen as the main 




3. The role of banks, fragility and regulation 
Banks provide transaction and payment system services, insurance, and risk sharing 
(transforming illiquid assets into liquid liabilities). A central function of banks is the 
financing and monitoring of entrepreneurial projects which are illiquid and opaque 
because of asymmetric information problems like adverse selection and moral hazard. A 
lender needs relationship-specific skills to collect those loans that are illiquid because the 
financed projects are opaque. Indeed, a main function of the banking and financial system 
is to help to overcome problems associated with asymmetric information in an economy. 
 
3.1 Fragility and the uniqueness of banks 
The essence of banks is that they create liquidity and this leaves them vulnerable to runs. 
Banks protect entrepreneurs from the liquidity needs of depositors/investors. There are 
different versions of the story but this is the building stone of modern banking theory 
(Diamond and Dyvbig (1983), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998), Diamond and Rajan 
(2001)). The demand deposit contract, redeemable at par, creates a coordination problem 
for investors that either allows the banker not to extort rents on his abilities to collect 
illiquid loans (Diamond and Rajan (2001)) or disciplines bank managers subject to a 
moral hazard problem (Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Gale and Vives (2002)). Because of 
asymmetric information firms may get no funding because they do not have enough 
pledgeable income (fraction of their return that can be committed to be paid to outsiders). 
Banks come to the rescue, for example, by creating liquidity holding collateral and 
committing to make payments (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998)). In short, the 
standard deposit contract and loan provision to opaque entrepreneurial projects are 
complementary and central to the function of a bank. 
 
At the base of the fragility of banking there is a coordination problem of investors, who 
may decide to call back their short-term deposits or CDs and make a sound bank fail. The 
literature has presented two views of crises: the multiple equilibrium panic view (Bryant 
(1980), Diamond and Dyvbig (1983)) and the information-based view (Gorton (1985, 
1988) and Jacklin and Battacharya (1988)). According to the former, runs are triggered 
by sunspots, i.e. by events unrelated to the fundamentals, while according to the latter 
runs are triggered by bad news on the assets of the bank. Recently those views have been 
reconciled introducing asymmetric information and linking the probability of a run to the 
strength of fundamentals (Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), and Rochet and Vives 
(2004)).
17 (In Section 4.1 I will examine the impact of competitive pressure on instability 
                                                 
17   Postlewaite and Vives (1987) provided an early model with a unique equilibrium where the probability 
of a crisis is determined by the realization of the liquidity needs of depositors, which are private 
information.  
  10in this context.) We have thus that a solvent bank may be subject to a panic, depositors 
withdrawing the funds invested and the bank being forced to quickly liquidate assets at a 
penalty. The cause of the problem is the dependence of banks on short-term debt.  
 
In addition, there is the danger of systemic risk owing to contagion from the failure of an 
entity, which may give rise to a strong negative externality both for the financial sector 
and for the real sector of the economy. For example, the failure of one entity may, 
through interbank market commitments, lead to that of others (see Allen and Gale 
(2000)). Similarly, large variations in the price of assets such as an abrupt fall in the stock 
market, or the failure of a major intermediary, may generate a domino effect and systemic 
crises affecting the payment system.
18 
 
Crises, however, may have positive aspects and in some circumstances be optimal from 
an ex ante point of view by making payment to depositors contingent on returns and 
improving risk sharing (Alonso (1996), Allen and Gale (1998)) or helping control the 
incentives of the banker (Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Gale and Vives (2002)). For 
example, in the presence of a moral hazard problem incentive efficiency requires that the 
expected utility of investors/depositors be maximized subject to the constraint that the 
bank manager exerts effort. This can be accomplished by liquidating the project when 
observable interim returns are lower than a certain threshold (this is the minimal 
threshold that induces the manager to exert effort, a higher threshold would just increase 
the costs associated to liquidation). The threat of liquidation disciplines banks managers 
but typically there is excessive liquidation and fragility (i.e. “excessive” coordination 
failure – Rochet and Vives (2004)). The reason is that competitive banking will typically 
reward investors over and above the level which imply the optimal threshold for 
liquidation. The challenge of regulation and supervision is to induce an incidence of 
crises just enough to keep the right incentives of bankers taking into account the degree 
of competition in the market (we will return to this question in Section 6). 
 
In summary, banks are unique because of their particular mix of features: High (short 
term) leverage, dispersed debtholders (implying a low level of monitoring), with opaque 
bank assets of long maturity which exacerbate moral hazard problems, fragile with a high 
social cost of failure, and subject to contagion (via interbank commitments or indirect 
market-based balance sheet linkages) with potentially systemic impact. At the same time 
banks have a central position in the economic system, they are indeed essential, when 
banks stop functioning a modern monetary economy stops. 
 
The situation may be even worse in an emerging economy where the role of banks is 
relatively more important since asymmetric information problems are bound to be more 
acute and financial markets less developed. Banks and their monitoring capacity are 
therefore at the center stage of economic development and their potential fragility may 
worsen downturns dramatically. 
 
                                                 
18   System-wide runs were usual in the US in the XIX century and the beginning of the XX century. More 
recently they have occurred in Brasil in 1990, Ecuador in 199), and Argentina in 2001.  
  113.2. Market failures and regulation 
Financial markets display the whole range of the major market failures: externalities, 
asymmetric information, and market power. 
 
The inherent fragility in the banking system leads to the failure of institutions, panics, and 
systemic crises that potentially have a major impact because of economy-wide 
externalities. The great depression of the 1930s and the subprime crisis are good 
examples, as well as the episodes of financial crisis in the US, Scandinavia, Mexico, East 
Asia and Russia, and remind us of the potential for severe economic disruption. The 
failure of a bank has adverse consequences on non-financial firms precisely because 
individual bank-firm relationships are valuable (Petersen and Rajan (1994)). In fact, even 
a contraction of bank capital may induce a credit crunch with severe disruption to the 
private sector. A major market failure is therefore the lack of internalization by financial 
intermediaries of the social cost of bankruptcy and potential systemic risk. Contagion 
may obtain because of network effects in the payment system, interbank market, or 




Asymmetric information is in fact the raison d’être of financial intermediaries. However, 
as we will see in Section 4.2 the agency problem in a bank leads to excessive risk taking 
because of moral hazard and risk-shifting incentives. Adverse selection in credit and 
financial markets may lead to the failure of competition and even market breakdown. 
The small investor is left unprotected if the market is not regulated. 
Imperfect competition is the norm and not the exception in banking. Very important 
frictions prevent banking from being perfectly competitive. Indeed, asymmetric 
information creates barriers to entry or makes competition not to deliver efficient 
outcomes. An example may be provided by credit rating agencies where conflicts of 
interest due to the issuer-pays model, entry restrictions, and a failure of the reputation 
mechanism seems to lead to a race to the bottom. Other sources of frictions are switching 
costs, network effects (in retail banking, credit cards, or markets in general) and the 
ubiquity of two-sided competition in the banking sector.  
 
Competitive banking will be in general excessively fragile and lender of last resort 
(LOLR) facilities, deposit insurance, “too big to fail” policies, and prudential regulation 
come to the rescue. They protect the system against negative economy-wide externalities. 
The aim of regulation has been to provide the banking and financial systems with 
stability to avoid the negative effects associated with failing institutions and systemic 
crises. Regulation also aims to protect the small investor. Other policies are established to 
promote the competitiveness of the system and to maintain competitive markets 
(competition policy).  
 
Financial regulation is not without side effects. The most important one is the potential 
moral hazard induced by protection and bail outs extended to failing institutions. (We 
                                                 
19   See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for a model of a liquidity spiral combining market and funding 
liquidity. 
  12will come back to this issue in Sections 4.2 and 6 where we will see the effects of 
regulatory pitfalls.) The LOLR and deposit insurance are two of the basic instruments on 
which the stability of the banking system rests. However, often blanket insurance is offered 
to banks and depositors according to the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy. The TBTF policy is 
justified usually on the potentially systemic consequences of the failure of a large institution, 
but help may be a reflection of a problem of time-inconsistency. In the presence of a moral 
hazard problem in the banking sector (say, the level of effort in monitoring projects by 
the banker) a well-intentioned regulator will find it optimal ex post to help whenever this 
salvages the value of projects. Bankers, anticipating the help, will tend to exert 
suboptimal effort (see Gale and Vives (2002)). This is an instance of the time-
inconsistency problem faced by a central bank, for example. Ex post, costly liquidation of 
the projects will not be optimal, so the central bank may be soft. The commitment 
problem is compounded by the interest of a bank manager in the continuation of the bank. 
Building a central bank with a “tough” reputation can alleviate the time-inconsistency 
problem. Similarly, suspension of convertibility may remove incentives of depositors to 
run (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) but if the banking authority can not pre-commit to 
such a deposit freeze and uses an ex-post efficient (softer) intervention then runs will be 
encouraged (Ennis and Keister (2009)).  
 
In emerging markets asymmetric information problems are more acute and the reliance 
on the banking system to try to overcome them more important. On top these economies 
face a more severe policy commitment problem that leads to excessive bailouts and 
potential devaluation of claims of foreign investors. This exacerbates the moral hazard 
problem and provides a reason for importing external discipline (for example, acquiring 
foreign short-term debt). However, external discipline may come at the cost of excessive 




4. Competition and stability 
Competition may influence stability basically through the liability or through the asset 
side of the balance sheet of a financial intermediary. In particular, competition may 
increase instability by (1) exacerbating the coordination problem of depositors/investors 
on the liability side and fostering runs and/or panics which may be of systemic nature, 
and (2) increasing the incentives to take risk (on either the liability or asset sides) and 
raise failure probabilities. I will examine those possibilities in turn. For (1) I will sketch a 
model since it is a point not yet well understood.  
 
4.1 Competition, runs and fragility 
The first thing to notice is that competition is not responsible for fragility. Indeed, 
vulnerability to runs may emerge independently of market structure. This result is 
obtained by Matutes and Vives (1996) in a model which combines the banking model of 
Diamond (1984) with a differentiated duopolistic structure à la Hotelling. In the model 
the probability of failure of a bank is determined endogenously by the expectations of 
depositors. Those are self-fulfilling due to diversification-based scale economies: a bank 
which is perceived to be safer commands a larger margin and attracts a higher market 
  13share allowing a better diversification. The model admits multiple equilibria with corner 
solutions where only one bank is active or an equilibrium where no bank is active like in 
a systemic confidence crisis. This arises due to the coordination problem between 
depositors (much as in the network externalities literature) and its presence does not 
depend on market structure. A monopoly bank may suffer a run. However, an increase in 
rivalry does increase the probability of failure in an interior equilibrium of the depositor’s 
game where banks have positive market shares.
20 
 
Chang and Velasco (2001) present a model of financial crisis in emerging markets in the 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) tradition and find that financial liberalization increases the 
expected welfare of depositors but may increase also fragility. Liberalization is modeled 
as moving from a monopoly to a competitive situation. A monopolist bank holds 
depositors to their reservation level which implies that they are kept indifferent to an 
autarchic system with no financial intermediation. The monopolist bank does so by 
reducing payments to depositors and therefore its short-run liabilities. Profits act as a 
buffer against unexpected withdrawals. The consequence is that the bank is less likely to 
fall in the range where a self-fulfilling crisis occurs than in a competitive situation. 
Furthermore, monopoly banking has to deliver a lower level of welfare since a 
competitive bank maximizes the ex ante utility of depositors, taking into account the 




The recent reconciliation of the self-fulfilling theory of crises with the information and 
fundamentals driven view delivers insights into the competition-stability relationship 
without having to resort to sunspot variables to explain how investors coordinate in one 
equilibrium.  
 
Traditional bank runs were typically the outcome of massive deposit withdrawals by 
individual depositors. Modern bank runs are typically the outcome of non-renewal of 
short-term credit in the interbank market, like in the case of Northern Rock or the 2007 
run on SIV.  
 
Let us consider a stylized banking crisis model based on Rochet and Vives (2004) and 
Vives (2010a). The model has three dates:  0 1 2 t, ,  . On date  0 t  , the bank has equityE  
(or, more in general stable funds) and collects uninsured certificates of deposit (CDs) or 
short-term uninsured debt in amount  0 1 D  . These funds are used to finance risky 
investment  I  and cash reservesM . The returns  I   on these assets are collected on date 
 and if the bank can meet its obligations, the CDs are repaid at their face value  , 
and the equityholders of the bank obtain the residual (if any). A continuum of fund 
managers makes investment decisions in the interbank market. At   each fund 
manager, after the observation of a (conditionally independent) private signal about the 
2 t  D
1 t 
                                                 
20   Smith (1984) links instability in a model à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to the non-existence of 
equilibrium. 
21   Todd Keister has raised a similar point when discussing the paper.  
  14future realization of  ,   decides whether to cancel ( 1 i y  ) or renew his CD ( ). It is 
assumed that all random variables follow a Gaussian distribution with 
0 i y 

1 N,    
   and 
the private signal for investor i is  i s i      with i.i.d. distributed noise  
1
 0 i N,  
   
orthogonal to  .  
 
Let  y   be the amount of withdrawals. If  y M   then the bank has to sell some of its assets 
to meet payments. A fund manager or investor adopts a behavioral rule of the type: 
cancel the investment if and only if the probability that the bank fails is above threshold 
. This will come about, for example, if the fund manager is rewarded for taking 
the right decision (that is, withdrawing if and only if the bank fails).  
 01 ,   
 
Let   be the liquidity ratio;  mM  / D   / I L  DM  , the solvency threshold of the 
bank;  0    the fire sales premium of early sales of bank assets; and   1 H L     the 
“supersolvency” threshold such that a bank does not fail even if no fund manager renews 











0 t  For  L    . When taking into account the balance sheet constraint at  , 
 we have that  0 I  ED M     
11 d m
 1 m/ L  D/E      , where     is the short-
term leverage ratio and  0 D dD   the return of the short-term debt. An increase in the 




The model can be reinterpreted replacing bank by country and the short-term debt by 
foreign-denominated short-term debt.  
 
The game among investors is a symmetric binary action game of strategic 
complementarities.
22 If the state of the world is known, then if  L   it is a dominant 
strategy to withdraw; if  H     then it is a dominant strategy not to withdraw; and for 
 LH ,      both equilibria coexist. It can be shown that with incomplete information an 
equilibrium is characterized by two thresholds   s, 
   with s
 yielding the signal 
threshold below which an investor withdraws and    L , H 
    the state-of-the-world 
critical threshold, below which the acting mass of investors makes the bank fail. There 
are at most three equilibria. There is a critical liquidity ratio    01 , m  such that   L  
   
                                                 
22   Related examples can be found in Morris and Shin (1998, 2004)) and Corsetti et al. (2006). In a game 
of strategic complementarities the marginal return of the action of a player is increasing in the level of 
the actions of rivals. This leads to best replies being monotone increasing. See Vives (2005). 
  15for mm  , and for mm   we have that  L  
   and then the equilibrium is unique if and 
only if  
 12 1 1 1 2
/ dm
         . 
23 The reason is as follows. Let   ˆ R s  be the best 
reply threshold of a player to the (common) signal threshold  used by the other players. 
The game is, indeed, of strategic complementarities with 
ˆ s
0 R'  : a higher threshold   by 
others induces a player to use also a higher threshold. It can be shown that if 
ˆ s

12 1 1 1 2
/ dm
    
      then  1 ˆ R'(s) . This ensures that R( )  crosses the 45  
line only once and that the equilibrium is unique. In Figure 8 the uniqueness case is 
illustrated with the flatter reaction curve and the one with multiple equilibria (three) with 




R(   ) 
Figure 8: Best response of a player to the threshold strategy ˆ s  used by rivals. 
 
Multiple equilibria come about when strategic complementarity is strong enough (the 
steeper best response in Figure 8) and this is a function of the slope of the best response. 
The maximal value of the slope is    
11 
1 2 dm
         
d
  . Strategic 
complementarity will be larger in a more competitive situation ( larger) and when the 
fire sales penalty   is higher. It will be smaller with small noise in the signals in relation 
to the prior ( /     ). With small noise in the signal a player faces greater of uncertainty 
about the behavior of others and the strategic complementarity is lessened. 
 
                                                 
23   All the results presented in this section are to be found in Vives (2010). 
  16At equilibrium with threshold 
, when  
   the acting mass of withdrawing investors 
make the bank fail and therefore the probability of occurrence of a “crisis” is   Pr  
  .  
A crisis occurs for low values of the fundamentals. In contrast, in the complete 
information model there are multiple self-fulfilling equilibria in the range  L H ,   . In 
onsequence the m c odel builds a bridge between the self-fulfilling theory of crisis (e.g., 
)). 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) and the theory that links crisis to the fundamentals (e.g., 
Gorton (1985
 
In the range   L,  
    there is coordination failure from the point of view of the institution 
attacked, the bank is solvent but illiquid, that is, the bank would have no problem if only 
investors would renew their CDs, but in the range they do not and the bank is illiquid. 
orrespondi risk of illiquidity is therefore given by  ngly, the    L Pr  
   and the risk  C
of insolvenc  y by     LL r  P       .  
 
er  Whenev mm   and there is a unique equilibrium and an increase in d or    increases 
both  
 and s
, the probability of crisis    P  
  , and the range of fundamentals 
 L,  
   for which there is coordination failure (Vives (2010a)).
24 An increase in the 
vulnerability of banks, be it the face value of deposits of bank or level of fire-sales 
premium for early liquidation, increases fragility by increasing the degree of strategic 
complementarity. Furthermore, a release of a public signal   h
 eq rium thresholds which is enh  or 
as a (negative) multiplier 
effect on uilib anced if d   are h  Indeed, the 
eshold is determined by 
igher.
equilibrium signal thr   0
** Rs; s    . From ollows 
that  










whenever the uniqueness condition  1 R'   is met since  0 R'  . In consequence, an 
increase in   will have a larger effect on the equilibrium threshold s
 than the direct 
impact on the best response of a player  R /    . This multiplier effect is largest when 
R'  is close to 1, that is, when strategic complementarities are strong, and we approach 
the region of multiplicity of equilibria. This is so when d or    are large. Public 
information has a coordinating potential beyond its strict information content (as 
mphasized by Morris and Shin (2002)). Ev e ery investor kno e in ws that an increas    will 
  
shift downward the best replies of the rest of the investors and everyone will be more 
cautious in withdrawing.  
 
                                               
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) also show how increasin
24   g the deposit rate increases the probability of a 
.   run of depositors in a model of the global games type
  17Consistently with the result, there is experimental evidence that bank runs occur less 
ank in trouble to avoid contagion (Allen and Gale (2004), Sáez 
nd Shi (2004)) or may impede its provision (as banks with surplus funds underprovide 
 
 are m
frequently when banks face less stress in the sense of a larger number of withdrawals 
being necessary to induce insolvency.
25 
 
The presence of market power in the interbank market may either facilitate liquidity 
provision (because liquidity is a public good and then sound banks may have an incentive 
to provide liquidity to a b
a
lending strategically to induce fire-sales of bank-specific assets of needy intermediaries 
(Acharya et al. (2009)).  
The comparative statics results hold even if there ultiple equilibria for the extremal 
(stable) equilibria. It can be shown that extremal equilibrium thresholds  ,s 
  decrease 
with   and with decreases in stress indicator d or   . Considering out-of-equilibrium 
adjustment in the form of best-reply dynamics where, at any stage after the perturbation 
from equilibrium, a new state of the world   is 
ltiplicity
drawn independently and a player 
responds to the strategy threshold used by other players at the previous stage, a similar 
result holds since the middle “unstable” equilibrium becomes irrelevant. Interestingly, the 
region of mu    
 
12 1 1 2
/    
1 dm    is enlarged with   an increase in stress 
indicator d or   and/or an increase in the precision of the public signal in relation to the 
private ones /     . 
 
Regulation in the form of solvency and/or liquidity requirem  help to c trol the 
probabilities of insolvency and illiquidity (Vives (2010a)). Indeed, the probability of 
ents may on
insolvency    L Pr    is decreasing in mM D   (assuming
11 d
  that 10    as is 




  , nd 
1 d
   since   a
  1 L m/ d m      . The probability of a crisis 
11    Pr     (including the 
probability of illiquidity) is decreasing in m , 
1

   (and also in 
1 d
  and 
1 
 ) since 
 is.  
 
From this it follows that both the solvency and the liquidity requirements needed to 
control the probabilities of insolvency and illiquidity may ha e to b ome tighter in a 
more competitive enviro here d  is higher. Furthermore, the liquidity requ t 
may have to become tighter in a crisis situation where 
v ec
nment w iremen
  is higher.
26 However, account 
must be made that there is a partial substitutability b tween m  and 
1    since they both 
contribute to decrease  and  L
e
 
. In the limit case of almost perfect signals,    , 
which allows f r a closed-form solution, it can be checked that in a more competitive 
environment (with high
o
on s t-term debt  ) the solvency requireme
e strengthened (but not the liquidity ratio), while in a crisis situation (where the fire 
                                                
er return  hor d nt has to 
b
 
25   See Madies (2006) and Garratt and Keister (2009).  
26   See Vives (2009). 
  18sales penalty   increases) the liquidity requirement has to be strengthened while the 
solvency one relaxed.  
 
Consistently with the results presented there is evidence that banks with relied less on 
but more 
ordination problem of investors/depositors and 
ity of equilibria region). 
for which there is coordination failure of investors 
(and the institution is solvent but illiquid). 
 is worth  out that the socially optimal probability of a crisis is positive in 
eceding results do not imply 




In summary, runs can happen independently of the level of competition 
competitive pressure worsens the co
increases: 
(i)  Potential instability (enlarging the multiplic
(ii)  The probability of a crisis. 
(iii)  The range of fundamentals 
(iv)  The impact of bad news on fundamentals. 
(v)  The solvency requirement. 
 
It  pointing
general because of its disciplining effect. Therefore the pr
that competitive pressure has to be minimized.  
 
4.2 Competition and risk taking 
Banks will have excessive incentives to take risk in the presence of limited liability (for 
shareholders and managers) and moral hazard (non-observable risk on asset side). This is 
exacerbated by flat deposit insurance and the problem is particularly acute for banks 
close to insolvency/bankruptcy. Indeed, limited liability will imply that banks will take 
excessive risk on the asset side except if the risk position of the bank can be assessed (for 
example, by large holders of CDs). A bank then cannot increase its market share and 
rofits by ta  more risk because investors discount it. However, introducing flat 
                                                
p king
premium deposit insurance (or bailouts) destroys the disciplining effect of the market 
because then investors do not care about the failure of the bank. 
 
Intense competition may worsen the excessive risk taking problem because high profits 
provide a buffer and increase the “charter value” of the bank. In a dynamic setting market 
power enhances the charter value of a bank and makes the bank more conservative. 
Indeed, a bank with more market power enjoys higher profits and has more to lose if it 
takes more risk, fails and its charter is revoked and if future profits weigh enough the 
bank will moderate its risk taking. Besanko and Thakor (1993) make this point with the 
value created with relationship banking, and Boot and Greenbaum (1993) with 
reputational benefits, both eroded with more competition.
  28 Matutes and Vives (2000) 
consider an imperfect competition model where banks are differentiated, have limited 
liability and there are social costs of failure (which could include a systemic component). 
 
27    See Ratnovski and Huang (2009) with evidence from the 72 largest commercial banks in OECD 
countries.  
28   A better reputation lowers the cost of outside finance to the bank.  
  19The authors show that deposit rates are too high when competition is intense and the 
social cost of failure high. If the risk assumed by the investments of the bank is not 
observable then the incentives to take risk are maximal. Flat premium deposit insurance 
tends to make the banks more aggressive by increasing the elasticity of the residual 
supply of deposits faced by the bank (this is also the result in Matutes and Vives (1996)). 
Furthermore, with risk-insensitive insurance deposit rates will be too high with intense 
competition even with no social cost of failure and there is no discipline on the asset risk 
taken. Allen and Gale (2004) consider banks competing à la Cournot in the deposit 
arket and choose a risk level on the asset side. With insured depositors they show that 
nts, Allen and Gale 
004)). A larger number of banks may increase also the chance that bad borrowers get 
ber of banks is sufficiently large, the risk-shifting effect is always dominated by 
e margin effect). In summary, when both banks and firms have to monitor their 
                                                
m




With heterogeneous borrowers tougher competition may lead to a more risky portfolio’s 
of banks and higher failure probabilities. This is so because more rivalry may reduce 
incentives to screen borrowers (the bank has less informational re
(2
credit by reducing the screening ability of each bank due to adverse selection/winner’s 
curse problem (Broecker (1990), Riordan (1993), Gehrig (1998)).
30  
 
However, competition tends to lower the rates that firms have to pay for loans and 
therefore may improve the average quality of loan applicants and/or lower the need to 
ration credit. For example, better terms for entrepreneurs means that they make more 
profits and become more cautious, affecting in turn the probability of failure of the bank 
(Caminal and Matutes (2002); Boyd and De Nicolò (2005)). Martinez-Miera and Repullo 
(2008) show that this argument does not take into account that lower rates also reduce the 
banks’ revenues from non-defaulting loans. When this is accounted for, there is a U-
shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure (in particular, when 
the num
th
investments there is a potential ambiguous relationship between market structure and risk 
taking. 
 
A bank faces both adverse selection and moral hazard problems when lending to firms. A 
higher rate set by the bank will tend to draw riskier applicants (adverse selection) and/or 
induce the borrower firms, which have also limited liability, to choose riskier projects 
(moral hazard). We know that banks may find optimal then to ration credit instead of 
raising the interest rate. A bank with market power has more incentive to alleviate this 
asymmetric information problem by investing in monitoring the projects of firms and 
establishing long term relations with customers.
31 This effect tends to increase the 
availability of credit to firms. Market power has also the usual effect of increasing the 
lending rate and therefore increasing the tendency towards credit rationing to avoid the 
 
29   See also Hellman et al. (2000), and Cordella and Yeyati (2002). 
30   It should be taken into account also that endogenous fixed costs due to information gathered via 
lending may induce a natural oligopoly in banking (Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999), Dell’Ariccia (2001)). 
31  Besanko and Thakor (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995). 
  20increase of the average risk in the pool of applicants. Even abstracting from the 
possibility of banking failure market power presents a welfare trade-off since more bank 
market clout diminishes the moral hazard problem faced by the bank but aggravates the 
problem for the entrepreneur. The result is that some market power tends to be good 
unless monitoring is very costly.  If banking failure is a possibility then the analysis 
becomes more complex.  Higher lending rates due to market power tend to depress 
investment and, under plausible assumptions with multiplicative uncertainty, to decrease 
the overall portfolio risk of the bank. More rivalry should increase then the probability of 
failure of the bank. However, more competition may destroy also incentives to monitor 
nd therefore reduce lending. If the latter effect is strong enough a monopolistic bank 
 the 
vel of competition will tend to increase risk taking incentives and the probability of 
ilure of banks. This tendency may be checked by reputational concerns, by the presence 
of managers, or by appropriate regulation and supervision. 
r 31 years have increased 
ompetition and eroded banks’ market power (measured again by Tobin’s  ), banks with 
isk-shifting to the taxpayer and systemic crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
                                                
a
may be more exposed to aggregate uncertainty (because it tends to ration credit less) and 
be more likely to fail.
32 
 
All in all, despite the complexity of the relationship between competition and risk taking 
it seems plausible to expect that, once a certain threshold is reached, an increase in
le
fa




Increased competition after liberalization and deregulation in the US in the 1980s led to 
increased risk taking by banks (Keeley (1990), Edwards and Mishkin (1995), Demsetz et 
al. (1996), Galloway et al. (1997)). Keeley finds that a higher Tobin’s q(as a measure of 
charter value) is positively associated with high capital-to-asset ratios in US bank holding 
companies in the period 1971-1986. Furthermore, he finds that interest rates of large CDs 
for large banking holding companies between 1984 and 1986 are negatively related to q. 
It seems also that the increase in risk held in particular by large banks which were TBTF 
(Boyd and Gertler (1993)). However, there is controversy over whether this increase in 
competition led to lower or higher loan losses (see Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) and Dick 
(2007), respectively). Saurina et al. (2007) claim that non performing loans in Spanish 
banks decrease with increases in the Lerner index in the loan market.
33 Salas and Saurina 
(2003) find that liberalization measures in Spain ove
q c
lower charter values tend to have lower equity–assets ratios (lower solvency) and to 
experience higher credit risk (loan losses over total loans). 
 
Liberalization in a weak institutional environment and/or with inadequate regulation 
leads to r
(1998, 2001)). A similar situation seems to have happened in the wake of the subprime 
crisis with declining lending standards associated to securitization (Dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2008)). 
 
32   Caminal and Matutes (2002). 
33   However, a problem with their approach is that the risk premium in the Lerner index is a function of 
loan losses ratio which is a measure of nonperforming loans. 
  21The relations between concentration and stability are complex. On the one hand, a 
concentrated banking system with a few large banks may be easier to monitor and banks 
are potentially better diversified. But on the other hand large banks may be TBTF, 
receive larger subsidies, and have incentive to take more risk. Furthermore, large banks 
nd to be more complex and harder to monitor as well as more interdependent (leading 
sion is reached by 
chaek et al. (2009) using the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic to proxy for competition with data 
                                                
te
to more systemic risk). The evidence also points to a complex relationship between 
concentration and stability. 
 
Several studies have attempted to provide cross-country evidence on the effects of 
liberalization and increase in competition on both individual and systemic bank failures. 
Berger et al. (2009) in a cross-country study of 23 developed nations show that market 
power (as measured by the Lerner index or the HHI on deposits/loans at national level) 
increases loan portfolio risk of banks but decreases overall risk because banks with 
market power hold more equity capital. Beck et al. (2006) in a cross-country study of 69 
nations (1980-1997) show that systemic crises are less likely in concentrated banking 
systems (measured by the three-firm concentration ratio on total assets, controlling for 
macro, financial, regulatory, institutional and cultural characteristics) and that fewer 
regulatory restrictions (on entry, activities, facility for competition) are associated with 
less systemic fragility. This would seem to indicate that concentration does not proxy for 
competition and puts into question that market power is stabilizing. However, the 
relevant connection is between concentration in relevant markets (which need not be 
directly linked with aggregate asset concentration) and competition. Furthermore, 
concentration is, in fact, endogenous and more competition may increase concentration in 
a free entry world (as there is less room for entrants).
34 In this sense to find both 
concentration and competition positively associated to stability should not be surprising. 
Concentrated systems tend to have larger and better-diversified banks (controlling for the 
size of the domestic economy eliminates the relationship between concentration and 
crises) but no connection is found with the ease of monitoring banks. The message of 
Beck et al. (2006) seems to be: “More competitive banking systems are associated with 
less fragility when controlling for concentration”. A similar conclu
S
for the period 1980-2005 and 45 countries. Those authors, however, find that 
concentration itself is associated with a higher probability of a crisis.  
 
Boyd, De Nicolò, and Loukoianova (2009) in a cross-country study with individual bank 
data use a model-based definition of stress or crisis and find that more concentration 
leads to a higher probability of a systemic shock but not a larger probability of 
government intervention. The authors claim that indicators of banking crises in the 
literature are in fact indicators of the government response to the crisis (and that those are 
predicted by base indicators such as sharp reductions in profits, loans and deposits). 
According to the authors the interpretation of the results in Beck et al. (2006) would be 
that more concentration leads to less intervention (more forbearance by regulators) and 
more systemic crises, and that less barriers to entry lead to less intervention and less 
crises. Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal (2009) in a cross-country study with individual bank 
 
34   See Vives (2000).  
  22data (in emerging economies and US banks) find also that more concentration leads to 
increased probability of failure of banks and that bank competition fosters willingness to 
nd. Shehzad and De Haan (2009) with cross-country data (1973-2002) find that certain 
 value. It has also 
een claimed that increased consolidation has led to increased systemic risk in the US by 
                                                
le
dimensions of liberalization reduce the likelihood of systemic crises conditional on 
adequate banking supervision.  
 
Diversification can be achieved with mergers between financial institutions but large 
banks need not be better diversified. Empirical studies in the US find strong benefits of 
consolidation (improving profitability and production efficiency, and reducing insolvency 
risk) when the degree of macroeconomic (geographic) diversification increases (Hughes 
et al (1996, 1998)).
35 More precisely, those authors find that geographic diversification 
offsets the tendency of larger banks to take more insolvency risk (controlling for 
diversification). An expansion in asset size is associated with a less than proportionate 
increase in expected profit and a more than proportionate increase in risk. An expansion 
in asset size and the number of branches within the same state is associated with a more 
than proportionate increase in expected profit and a less than proportionate increase in 
risk. An expansion in asset size, branches and diversification across states is associated 
with an improvement in value efficiency and reduction of insolvency risk. Consolidation 
within the state reduces insolvency risk but does not improve market
b
looking at the positive trend of stock returns correlations for large and complex banking 
organizations in the period 1988-1999 (De Nicolò and Kwast (2002)). 
 
Internationalization is a way to achieve diversification. Furthermore, allowing 
multinational banks into previously protected markets may increase the range of financial 
services offered in the domestic market and lower margins. A side effect may be the 
erosion in the charter value of domestic banks inducing them to take on more risk. Both 
cross-border banking and foreign bank entry have been seen to improve financial 
intermediation, foster growth and reduce fragility (see Claessens (2006) and Barth et al. 
(2004)). The effects have happened both directly and indirectly with competitive 
reactions of domestic banks. However, some evidence points also at mixed distributional 
effects of foreign bank entry. Detragiache et al. (2008) find that foreign bank entry in 
poor countries may lower private credit growth. Berger et al. (2001) find that large 
foreign-owned institutions concentrate on large-scale projects and may leave aside small 
firms. Still, large well-capitalized foreign banks may have also an influence providing 
stability to the domestic financial system of an emerging economy. However, while the 
headquarters of foreign banks would provide help to a subsidiary when a problem 
develops (because the brand name and the franchise value of the bank are at stake), this 
need not hold when a systemic problem develops (as an example take the case of the 
collapse of the currency board in Argentina).
36 Furthermore, even if foreign bank 
headquarters were willing to help, they need not do so at the optimal social level, since 
they will not take into account the external effects of their help. For example, the 
 
35   See also Demsetz and Strahan (1997). 
36   Headquarters have to back the deposits in a branch, but need not do it for a subsidiary. 
  23headquarters of foreign banks may want to limit their exposure to a country that may face 
a currency crisis and therefore will tighten liquidity provision to branches or subsidiaries 
in the country. Finally, the incentives of a foreign lender of last resort and supervisor 
need not be in line with local interests. A foreign supervisor will not take into account the 
onsequences (systemic or not) for domestic residents of a restructuring of a local branch 
n more vulnerable than 
, all the US ones have collapsed or 
(lik
hile a strong 
etition 
(e.g. low entry barriers, openness to foreign entry) and stability. 
(iii)  The association of concentration and stability presents mixed results. 
 also more risk.  
                                                
c




Finally, there is ample evidence that institutions close to insolvency have incentives to 
gamble for resurrection (e.g. S&Ls crisis).  
 
It is worth noting that the financial crisis seems to have affected banks in countries with 
different concentration levels and market structures. Although it has been pointed out, for 
example, that concentrated banking systems like in Australia and Canada have fared 
better in the crisis than unconcentrated ones like in the US or Germany there have also 
been problems in concentrated countries like the Netherlands or the UK (for retail 
banking). Furthermore, other factors are at play, in Canada (and to a lesser extent both 
Australia) banks get their funds mostly from deposits and not in the wholesale market and 
in both countries are subject to strict regulatory requirements. Reliance on non-interest 
income has also proved to be a source of increased risk and vulnerability.
38 By the same 
token it is not evident that certain types of institutions have bee
others. Both specialized investment banks (in fact
converted to commercial banks), insurance companies like AIG, and universal banks 
e UBS, Citigroup, or German and UK banks) have suffered.  
In conclusion, the evidence points to the following: 
(i)  Liberalization increases the occurrence of banking crises w
institutional environment and adequate regulation mitigate them. 
(ii)  There is a positive association between some measures of bank comp
(iv)  Larger banks tend to be better diversified but may take
 
 
6. Can we regulate away the competition-stability trade-off? 
We have seen how limited liability will imply that banks will take excessive risk on the 
asset side except if the risk position is observable and market discipline works. 
Disclosure requirements may help making the risk position of the bank known (or more 
realistically, better assessed). This is represented by the top row in Table 1. If the asset 
risk position of the bank is not observable then incentives to take risk are much increased 
(second row of Table 1) and become maximal when risk-insensitive insurance is 
introduced since then monitoring incentives are destroyed (third row in Table 1). Risk-
based deposit insurance moderates risk taking incentives and undo the limited liability 
 
37   See Vives (2006) for further discussion. 
38   See Baele et al. (2007), De Jonghe (2010), Demigüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), and Ratnosvski and 
Huang (2009).  
  24charter of the bank but still banks may take too much risk in the presence of a large social 
cost of failure which they do not internalize (bottom row in Table 1). In the top and 
ottom rows an instrument like capital requirements may be sufficient to check risk 
feasible to 
troduce disclosure requirements of the market positions of banks, it is more difficult to 
ssess the risk level of the il f a bank. ore, more disclosure 
ay in fact induce informati ors generating instability. 
cen
b




The general trend in banking regulation has been to check risk taking with capital 
requirements and appropriate supervision. Both risk-based (deposit) insurance and 
disclosure requirements have been proposed to limit risk-taking behavior. Advanced 
economies have tried to move towards the top and the bottom rows of Table 1. This 
movement was accompanied by a reform of the 1988 Basel Accord on capital 
requirements to adjust them better for risk (Basel II). Capital requirements together with 
supervision and market discipline are the three pillars on which Basel II regulatory 
reform is based.




liquid loan portfolio o




 Risk-taking  in tives   
Banking regimes 
Liability  Asset 
nt)  (rates)  (investme Regulation 
Free banking 
(observable risk/high  
disclosure) 
Medium-low Absent  Capital  requirements 
Free banking (unobservable 
risk/low disclosure) 
m-high  Mediu Maximal  Capital requirements and asset 
restrictions 
Risk-insensitive insurance  High  Maximal  Capital requirements and asset 
restrictions 
Risk-based insurance  Low  Absent Capital  requirements 
Table 1. Possible banking regimes, the incentives to take risk on the liability and asset sides, and 
bottom rows of the table. Disclosure and risk assessment have been deficient (among 
other things because of the failure of rating agencies), and market discipline has been 
ineffective because of the blanket insurance offered by TBTF policies. Furthermore, 
                                                
the necessary regulatory instruments when charter values have low values and the social cost of 
failure is high. 
 
The present crisis is a testimony of the failure of the strategy to move towards the top and 
 
39   See Matutes and Vives (2000), Hellmann et al. (2000), and Repullo (2004). 
40   According to Basel II’s guidelines on capital requirements that banks can either adopt a “standardized” 
approach in which external rating agencies will be used to set the risk weight for the different types of 
loans (say corporate, banks, and sovereign claims) or an internal-rating-based approach in which banks 
estimate the probability of default and also the loss given default in an advanced version of the method. 
The idea is to calibrate the capital requirement so that it covers the Value at Risk (expected and 
unexpected) from the loan under some assumptions. 
  25capital regulation has not taken into account systemic effects (the social cost of failure) 
and assets restrictions have been lifted under the pressure of investment bank lobbies.
41 
 
We are stuck in the “risk-insensitive insurance” row with maximal risk taking incentives. 
We need therefore to design appropriate capital requirements and asset restrictions. 
Optimal regulation would need a combination of risk-based insurance for deposits (which 
implies that insurance premiums are contingent on the rates offered by banks as well as 
their asset risk position and eliminates, or compensates exactly, limited liability) and 
systemic capital charges that internalize the social cost of failure of banks. If the asset 
risk position of banks is not observable then insurance can not be contingent on it and 
banks will be induced to take maximal risk on the asset side. This will have to be checked 
with asset restrictions (e.g., separation of banking and proprietary trading/investment 
banking activities). Furthermore, the appropriate level of the systemic capital charge will 
depend in general (in an increasing way) on the intensity of competition, and will be 
binding in a low-medium friction environment.  
 
According to the analysis in Matutes and Vives (2000) the level of capital requirement 
will be an increasing function of both the social cost of failure   and the intensity of 
competition (inverse friction) in the market (
K
 , which in the model goes from maximal 
differentiation  0    to no differentiation  1   ). This is so since typically the level of 
friction is not only a behavioral parameter but a parameter that enters the utility 
function.
42 In this case a capital requirement should be set as a function of the level of  . 
This result is consistent with the analysis in section 4.1 where the solvency requirement 
has to be tightened in a more competitive environment. 
 
Figure 9 depicts the regions in the space of intensity of competition   (with  0    for an 
independent monopolies situation and  1    for perfect competition) and social cost of 
failure   for which it is optimal to disintermediate (“optimal disintermediation”), and for 
which deposit rates are too high (r' ) or too low (
K
o r 
o r' r  ) from the welfare point of 
view. For a give level of competition   if   is very large it is optimal to 
disintermediate, if   is intermediate then banks are too aggressive and take too much 
risk on the liability side and a binding capital charge (as a function of 
K
K
 ) has to be 
imposed, and if   is low then banks are not aggressive enough, the capital charge will 
not be binding and an increase in competitive pressure would be welfare-enhancing. 
Competition policy pressure is needed in a high friction environment. 
K
 
                                                 
41    Financial regulation is known to be subject to strong lobby pressure. For example, Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999) document it in the process of abandonment of branching restrictions in the US. 
42   For example, differentiation – a source of friction and market power- is valued by customers. Then an 
increase in differentiation will imply that banking customers value more the volume offered by the 
bank and therefore a more lenient capital requirement is appropriate. 
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Source: Figure 3 in Matutes and Vives (2000). 
Figure 9: Comparison of market and optimal deposit rates as a function of the friction in the 
market (1/  ) and social cost of failure  .  K
 
With precise knowledge of   and 1 K /   the competition-stability trade-off can be 
regulated away. Just, set up the appropriate capital charge and let banks compete (with 
the usual enforcement of competition policy).  
 
The competition-stability tradeoff also applies to emerging economies. An emerging 
market economy is characterized by high uncertainty, increased likelihood and incidence 
of financial and currency crises, predominant financial role of banks, and weak 
supervisory structure. These characteristics make it much more difficult to follow the 
developed country regulatory strategy in an emerging market economy. First, it is more 
difficult to move toward a disclosure strategy because information problems are more 
acute and the production of information costlier. Second, risk-based deposit insurance 
can work only when insurance can be priced according to objective indicators of bank 
risk, which will be more difficult to obtain in an emerging market economy (and we 
know they are difficult to obtain even in a developed economy). This makes the move 
toward a risk-based insurance strategy more difficult (as the potentially problematic 
application of Basel II shows). It follows that regulation of banking and financial markets 
must be adapted for emerging market economies. Those economies will tend to have a 
higher cost of liquidation of projects and social cost of failure, as well as a higher level of 
friction. The first two factors will push towards a tightening of the regulation while the 
higher friction may pull in the opposite direction. 
 
In conclusion, the trade-off between competition and stability is complex but seems real 
(at least along some dimensions). Well-designed regulation may alleviate the trade-off 
  27but needs to take it into account. This means in particular that capital requirements with 
allowance for systemic externalities need to adjust for the level of friction in the market, 
becoming tighter when competition is more intense. In a world where fine-tuning of 
regulation is difficult (and the experience with banking regulation so far seems to indicate 
that this is the case) it does not seem prudent to strive for the complete elimination of 
market power in banking. This may have implications in terms of an optimal degree of 
concentration, which is likely to be intermediate. In emerging economies, optimal policy 
needs to carefully balance the impact of the different levels of friction and social cost of 
failure. In any case, what is clear is that competition should be limited for institutions 
close to insolvency. This should be done in a prompt corrective action frame where the 




7.  The policy response to a financial crisis
44 
 
7.1 Interventions and distortions 
In a systemic crisis situation there is tremendous pressure to stabilize the system. In the 
2007-2008 crisis we have witnessed an array of interventions: asset purchase and 
guarantee schemes (including extensions of deposit insurance, and guarantees in the 
interbank market and in mutual funds), capital injections, outright nationalization, and 
forced mergers. These interventions represent a large distortionary potential in terms of 
moral hazard, long term effects in market structure, protection of inefficient incumbents 
and creation of an uneven playing field (among different institutions and different 
countries). For example, helped institutions which have proved to be TBTF may end up 
with a lower cost of capital than others (not only in the short term but also in the long-
term because of the implicit guarantee they obtain). The result is that, ex-ante, the 
incentives are to take excessive risk. This is compounded with subsidy races to help 
national champions and marketplaces. This effect is particularly apparent in the EU 
posing a threat to the single market. The help provided to the system may foster 
regulatory forbearance to cover losses. There is indeed evidence that regulatory 
forbearance is prevalent and the government is less likely to close or take over failing 
bank when the banking sector is weak: the cases of S&Ls in the US, Japan’s banking 
crisis, and according to the evidence on 21 emerging countries of Brown and Dinç 
(2009)). Finally, help to banks has spillovers to other sectors that demand more help (like 
automobiles, for example).  
 
The crisis has forced mergers of institutions backed by government subsidies and/or 
guarantees.
45 The upshot is that surviving incumbents increase market power and have a 
                                                 
43   In fact, according to the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 
1991 when a bank solvency level is below a certain limit it cannot expand its assets. Larger decreases 
in solvency may trigger the need to recapitalize or even the imposition of rate ceilings. The idea of the 
FDICIA is to reduce the discretion of the regulator with rigid intervention rules which are gradual. 
(See, e.g., Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).) 
 
44   This section is based on Vives (2010b). 
  28lower cost of capital because they are TBTF (and/or because of the public help). Here it 
must be recalled that merger policy affects degree of competition and dynamic 
incentives. The takeover of a failed bank may reward an incumbent with temporary 
monopoly rents, inducing monopoly inefficiency but prudent behavior. This is optimal 
only if subsequent entry is facilitated (Perotti and Suarez (2002)). The danger now is that 
incumbents increase their market power and are protected from entry. A merger policy 
must have a long horizon, and even in a crisis situation, must consider the optimal degree 
of concentration in the industry, dynamic incentives for prudence of incumbents and the 
ease of entry. 
 
State intervention and even outright ownership have been necessary to stabilize the 
system. Indeed, when the taxpayer is footing the bill the public sector must have a say in 
the running of the helped institutions. However, government ownership is distortionary: 
government is on both sides of the regulatory relationship; political objectives/and 
incentives rule
46; if not disciplined by competition it induces less competitiveness of the 
banking system, inefficiency, and less financial stability with higher risk exposure and 
more bank losses (Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), Caprio and Martinez Peria (2002), 
De Nicolò and Loukoianova (2007)); it eliminates the market for corporate control; 
creates an uneven playing field (with implicit and explicit guarantees); and ends up 
inducing less competition and lower financial development. 
 
Policy intervention in a crisis has to walk a narrow path between the support measures to 
avoid contagion and protect financial stability, and the desire to maintain a vigorous long-
term competition. Unavoidably some trade-off between the two objectives, particularly in 
the short-term, will exist. When a systemic crisis strikes there is little time to react and 
support measures have to be implemented very quickly. Central banks, regulators and 
fiscal authorities provide the support measures and the competition authority has to watch 
for distortions on competition (including the formation of market structures non-
conducive to competition).  
 
Help to a bank typically provides a positive externality to other banks since it limits the 
spread of the crisis and protects the system mostly by avoiding contagion, be it 
informational or because of interbank exposures. This does not distort competition if it is 
liquidity help that allows a fundamentally sound bank to avoid contagion and ride the 
crisis. If the bank is in distress but has a solvency problem then this indicates that it 
                                                                                                                                                 
45   In the US, Bear Sterns merged in March 2008 with JP Morgan backed-up by the Federal Reserve, JP 
Morgan later in the year acquired banking assets of Washington Mutual from the FDIC, and Merrill 
Lynch merged with Bank of America (going over, together with Wells Fargo acquiring Wachovia in 
2008, the 10% national market share deposit threshold established by the Riegle-Neal Act (1994)). In 
the UK, the merger of HBOs and Lloyds TBS was approved against the OFT’s opinion (with partial 
nationalization) despite a 30% market share of the merged entity in current accounts/mortgages and 
competition problems in SME banking services in Scotland. It is worth noting that Lloyds was not 
allowed to take over Abbey in 2001.  
46   The evidence presented by Hau and Thum (2009) on board incompetence in German public banks 
(there is a wide difference in terms of education, financial and management experience in the 29 
largest German banks between private and public) is suggestive, linking larger losses borne in the 
crisis linked to the lack of professionalism in boards.  
  29should be restructured and help needs to come with strings attached so that competition is 
not distorted with “bad” banks displacing “good” ones in the business of customers. The 
counterfactual for whether help is distortionary has to take into account what would have 
happened if there had not been coordination failure of investors from the point of view of 
the distressed institution. That is, extracting the panic component in market behavior. 
This is not an easy task, particularly when compounded by regulatory failures which 
induce excessive risk taking.  
 
The main tools of intervention to limit distortions are structural (asset divestitures) and 
behavioral (pricing, advertising, acquisitions) restrictions. Structural commitments may 
help reduce the post-crisis over-capacity in the banking sector accumulated during the 
asset boom in many countries. Indeed, an added component in the present crisis is the 
extent of overcapacity in the banking system. The period of expansion with low interest 
rates has led to overexpansion of banking via credit particularly in those countries where 
there has been a real state bubble (e.g. US, Ireland, UK, Spain). This means that branches 
and personnel are to be cut together with the balance sheet of institutions even if credit is 
normalized (because it should stabilize below the pre-crisis bubble levels). In general, 
care must be taken so that the commitments, either structural or behavioral, leave the 
restructured bank as a viable competitor. This is obvious if the bank is a fundamentally 
sound one. If it is not then restructuring should prevent the bank from taking over 
business from healthy rivals which have not enjoyed help. In any case, the restructured 
bank has to be a viable competitor. An important point to check moral hazard is the 
removal of the management of the helped institution that has behaved imprudently. In 
this case the behavioral restrictions on the helped bank could be relaxed.  
 
7.2 The approach in the US and in the EU 
The role of the competition authority has been different in the US and in the EU. The 
reason is that the EU competition authority has the unique capability, among competition 
authorities, to control state aid. Since the crisis the EU has dealt with many banking aid 
cases (taking 22 decisions only in 2008 and 81 decisions as of December 17, 2009). Most 
of the cases (75) were approved without objection.
47 The EU has stated conditions for 
state guarantees/recapitalization (EU Communications October-December 2008) which 
have been formalized into temporary guidelines on restructuring aid to banks. The 
conditions imposed on helped institutions are mostly sensible since they try to minimize 
the distortions introduced by public help, in particular for non-fundamentally sound 
institutions.
48 The European Commission has been tough imposing or influencing some 
important balance sheet reductions and behavioral restrictions on helped entities such as 
ING, Northern Rock, RBS, Commerzbank or WesLandesbank. Interestingly, in the case 
of RBS, which has been ordered to sell some retail operations, insurance, and 
                                                 
47    66 more cases have been cleared under a temporary framework to support lending to firms. DG 
Competition (December 17, 2009), State aid: overview of national measures adopted as a response to 
the financial /economic crisis. 
48   There is a potential exception in the behavioral requirement which implies a commitment to expand 
lending. This is contradictory with the restrictive behavior that wants to be imposed on helped 
institutions and may induce bad practices since the business of a private bank is to lend and what has to 
be attacked are the causes why the bank is not lending. 
  30commodity-trading business, the Commission mentions concentration concerns with RBS 
being the leader in retail and corporate banking for small and medium-sized enterprises 
segments, while it mentions also the benefits of the divestments in terms of limiting 
moral hazard for insurance and commodity-trading business.
49 
 
Some of the measures can be understood in order to minimize competitive distortions of 
the aid, others in terms of checking moral hazard in the future. In principle, the role of the 
competition authority is to preserve competition and not to limit moral hazard, which is 
the role of the regulator. The important point is that the measures purely aimed at 
competitive distortions will have an impact also on ex ante incentives (and moral hazard) 
since a bank will know that help in case of trouble will come with restrictions. This has a 
connection with the TBTF issue. More broadly, the concept of competitive distortion may 
encompass competition based on an advantage of being under the TBTF umbrella. In this 
sense the restrictions on lines of activity which fall outside the regulated core banking 
business may make sense although they go beyond the standard competition concern and 
analysis. The RBS case points at the need of coordination between the competition 
authority and the regulator. 
 
The activism of the EU Commission poses the question of (future) competitive balance 
with aided US banks for which no divestitures have been required. This may prove 
important in particular in the segments of the banking business in which there is global 
competition. The Obama administration, under the advice of Paul Volcker, is advocating 
limits on size and scope (mostly on proprietary trading) of banks to avoid the “too big to 
fail” (TBTF) problem as well as controlling risk taking.
50 What the European 
Commission is trying to accomplish with state aid control the US may accomplish by 
regulation. The important side benefit of state aid control in the EU is that it limits the 
incentives of bankers to take excessive risk in the expectation of a bailout if things go 
wrong. That is, it addresses the TBTF issue. The competition authority may internalize 
that if when an institution fails it gets help, competition will be distorted. To limit the size 
(or better the systemically-corrected size) of an institution with break ups once they 
receive public help (something that the EU seems to be implementing) is an option which 
extends the realm of competition policy. However, the competition authority when 
ordering divestitures need not take into account systemic considerations. The US so far 
seems to be following another route where TBTF is explicitly not an antitrust problem 
(see White (2009)).  
 
In any case, size and scope restrictions are a blunt instrument to deal with the TBTF 
issue. Controls on size are problematic because interconnectedness and line of business 
specialization are more important than size for systemic risk. With regard to the scope of 
the banking firm, conflict of interest is what leads to potential market failure and is the 
                                                 
49    See DG Competition (December 14, 2009), State aid: Commission approves impaired asset relief 
measure and restructuring plan of RBS. 
50   See  http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-calls-new-restrictions-size-and-
scope-financial-institutions-rein-e.  
 
  31lead to indicate possible scope limitations. Higher capital and insurance charges for 
systemically important institutions together with effective resolution procedures may be a 
better way of dealing with the problem. This should be coupled with a serious 
consideration of conflicts of interest in financial conglomerates. The upshot is that the 
competition authority in its role of protecting competition may have a say in the TBTF 
issue and therefore its actions should be coordinated with the regulator. The potential for 
competition policy to provide a commitment device to partially address TBTF issues 
should not be dismissed.  
 
The Obama administration move is reminiscent of the XIX century antitrust tradition of 
looking with suspicion large firms because of the excessive power concentration they 
entail. Later on antitrust evolved with size not being an offense but market power in a 
particular market. The influence that investment banks have had in the deregulation of 
financial intermediaries and the ensuing enormous increase in leverage leading to the 
crisis is backfiring. We are in the territory of political economy and the question is how 
to better control excessive concentrations of power in a democratic society.  
 
 
8.  Summary and concluding remarks 
Liberalization has gone together with an increase in the competition faced by financial 
intermediaries and with an increase in the incidence of crises. Bank assets have not 
declined in relation to total financial assets and banking has transformed itself towards 
services provision. This restructuring has tended to increase aggregate concentration 
(although the consequences of this may have been different in relevant retail local 
markets in the US and Europe). The crisis points to a return to traditional banking and 
may tend to exacerbate the consolidation trend.  
 
Banks are unique because of their particular mix of features which makes them 
vulnerable to runs with potentially systemic impact and very important negative 
externalities for the economy. The fragility of a competitive banking system is typically 
excessive and financial regulation comes to the rescue at the cost of side effects and 
regulatory failure. The most important one is the potential moral hazard induced by 
protection and bail outs extended to failing institutions. The present crisis is a testimony 
of the failure of the three pillars of the Basel II system. Disclosure and risk assessment 
have been deficient (think of the failure of rating agencies), and market discipline has 
been ineffective because of the blanket insurance offered by TBTF policies. Capital 
regulation has not taken into account systemic effects (the social cost of failure) and 
assets restrictions have been lifted under the pressure of investment bank lobbies. 
Supervision has proved ineffective since it has allowed a shadow banking system to grow 
unchecked. 
 
Theory and empirics point to the existence of a trade-off between competition and 
stability along some dimensions. Indeed, runs happen independently of the level of 
competition but more competitive pressure worsens the coordination problem of 
investors/depositors and increases potential instability, the probability of a crisis and the 
impact of bad news on fundamentals. This does not imply that competitive pressure has 
  32to be minimized since the socially optimal probability of a crisis is positive in general 
because of its disciplining effect. On the asset side, once a certain threshold is reached, an 
increase in the level of competition will tend to increase risk taking incentives and the 
probability of failure of banks. This tendency may be checked by appropriate regulation 
and supervision. The evidence points to liberalization increasing the occurrence of 
banking crises while a strong institutional environment and adequate regulation 
mitigating them. At the same time, there is a positive association between some measures 
of bank competition (e.g. low entry barriers, openness to foreign entry) and stability. 
 
Regulation can alleviate the competition-stability trade-off but the design of optimal 
regulation has to take into account the intensity of competition. For example, capital 
charges should account for the degree of friction and rivalry in the environment of the 
banks, with tighter requirements in more competitive situations. Given that fine-tuning of 
regulation has proved very difficult in practice (this is probably an understatement given 
the massive regulatory failure that the crisis has uncovered), the trade-off between 
competition and stability is bound to persist and the coordination of regulation and 
competition policy in banking seems necessary. The uniqueness of banks, and not only in 
a crisis situation, should be recognized and the lessons drawn for the implementation of 
competition policy. 
 
The competition-stability tradeoff also applies to emerging economies. An emerging 
market economy is characterized by high uncertainty, increased likelihood and incidence 
of financial and currency crises, predominant financial role of banks, and weak 
supervisory structure. These characteristics make it much more difficult to follow the 
developed country regulatory strategy. Emerging economies will tend to have a higher 
cost of liquidation of projects and social cost of failure, as well as a higher level of 
friction. The first two factors will push towards a tightening of the regulation while the 
higher friction may pull in the opposite direction. In emerging economies, optimal policy 
needs to carefully balance the impact of the different levels of friction and social cost of 
failure. 
 
Merger policy in banking should be intertemporally consistent having in mind an optimal 
degree of concentration and dynamic incentives (rewarding prudence at the same time 
that entry is eased). An open issue is how to deal with TBTF institutions. In the US TBTF 
is not an antitrust issue while in the EU the competition authority controls distortions of 
competition which arise out of state aid and this has implications for TBTF. The 
credibility of the competition authority to impose conditions once an institution has been 
helped may provide a commitment device which has been seen lacking in bank bailouts. 
Controls on size are problematic because interconnectedness and line of business 
specialization are more important than size for systemic risk. With regard to the scope of 
the banking firm, conflict of interest is what leads to potential market failure and is the 
lead to indicate possible scope limitations. 
 
All this calls for close collaboration of the regulator (in charge of stability and prudential 
control) and the competition authority (in charge of the health of competition). First of 
all, regulatory requirements and competition policy intensity have to be coordinated. 
  33Capital charges may have to be fine tuned to the intensity of competition in the different 
market segments. Second, a protocol of collaboration of the regulator and the competition 
authority should also be put forward. This will be particularly important in crisis 
situations. The competition authority has the potential to provide commitment to address 
TBTF problems that derive into competition distortions; the regulator should address the 
TBTF issue and moral hazard with systemic capital charges, effective resolution 
procedures, and scope restrictions which target conflicts of interest. Finally, crisis 
procedures should be established delineating liquidity help from recapitalization and the 
conditions for restructuring to avoid competitive distortions. Entities which are close to 
insolvency should be tightly regulated (and its activities restricted) in a prompt corrective 
action frame.  
 
An open issue pertaining to the political economy of regulation is the debate over 
whether to let firms, banks in particular, get so large that have a decisive influence in 
regulation.  
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